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Abstract
The benefits, both in terms of productivity and public health, are investigated for
different levels of engagement with the test, trace and isolate procedures in the context
of a pandemic in which there is little or no herd immunity. Simple mathematical
modelling is used in the context of a single, relatively closed workplace such as a
factory or back-office where, in normal operation, each worker has lengthy interactions
with a fixed set of colleagues.
A discrete-time SEIR model on a fixed interaction graph is simulated with pa-
rameters that are motivated by the recent COVID-19 pandemic in the UK during a
post-peak phase, including a small risk of viral infection from outside the working en-
vironment. Two kinds of worker are assumed, transparents who regularly test, share
their results with colleagues and isolate as soon as a contact tests positive for the dis-
ease, and opaques who do none of these. Moreover, the simulations are constructed
as a “playable model” in which the transparency level, disease parameters and mean
interaction degree can be varied by the user. The model is analysed in the continuum
limit.
All simulations point to the double benefit of transparency in maximising produc-
tivity and minimising overall infection rates. Based on these findings, public policy
implications are discussed on how to incentivise this mutually beneficial behaviour in
different kinds of workplace, and simple recommendations are made.
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1 Introduction
This study is inspired by the current UK situation (June 2020) as the nation attempts to
restart the economy in the aftermath of the COVID-19 virus infection peak. The general
structure of our mathematical model and the parameter values chosen are specific to that
case study. The results are nevertheless intended to be applicable to more general situations
in any modern society where there is a residual risk of infection from a virus or other pathogen
with insufficient natural immunity in the general population.
There has been much recent evidence to suggest that the most effective containment
measure in a human epidemic with relatively small proportions of infectious individuals is
that of rapid testing, contact tracing and isolation of those in the contact group [13, 18]. The
effectiveness of such a strategy is thought to be a function of the basic reproduction number
of the infection, known as the R-value; this gives, on average, the number of new infections
that each infection generates. However, R itself is a crude measure, as its instantaneous
value will be a function not just on the basic disease dynamics, but on the behaviour of
infectious individuals.
The seminal paper of Keeling and Eames [11] introduced ideas from graph theory to
epidemiology, where the nature of interactions between infected and susceptible individuals
defines a dynamic contact network. Ideas from modern network science, such as the degree
distribution, can then be used to estimate statistical properties of the infection, such as the
R-number, and to evaluate the effectiveness of different potential treatment strategies; see
[14] for a relatively recent review of the state of the art.
The majority of studies that have looked at contact tracing as an effective means of viral
control have considered the question at a general population level. We note the recently
published studies [13, 18] which model the requirements of an effective testing, tracing and
isolation strategy to avoid a second-wave of the COVID-19. One should not however under-
estimate the required effort. For example, based on data obtained in a unique collaboration
with BBC, Kuchraski et al conclude ‘in a scenario where there were 1,000 new symptomatic
cases that met the definition to trigger contact tracing per day [. . .] 15,000–40,000 contacts
would be newly quarantined each day. [. . .] A high proportion of cases would need to self-
isolate and a high proportion of their contacts to be successfully traced to ensure an effective
reproduction number that is below one in the absence of other measures.’ This finding is even
more stark when combined with results, e.g. [15], that suggest that social isolation needs to
happen sufficiently quickly to be effective.
The most important features of any public health campaign built around testing, con-
tact tracing and isolation is the degree of compliance in the general population, which can
vary with the method used [16]. Evidence presented to Scientific Pandemic Influenza group
on Behaviour (SPI-B) as part of the advice offered to the UK Government Scientific Ad-
visory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) indicated a shortlist of factors that might help to
promote compliance with and, adherence to, all behaviours that minimise transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 infection. These apply equally to compliance with testing and contact tracing.
Factors included messaging that increased perceptions of risk, clear communications from
Government identifying what behaviours the public should adopt, encouraging support from
the community so creating social norms for infection-limiting behaviours and importantly,
actions making it as easy as possible for people testing positive to isolate [21, 22, 23]. Re-
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cent studies have indicated, however, that other factors may undermine compliance with
contact tracing. Perceived lack of data security and privacy, together with lack of trust in
government, were found to be the main barriers to adoption [1]. Even in relatively com-
pliant populations, contact tracing may not be sufficient to control the spread of the virus.
For example, the study [20] considered the effectiveness of two different methods of contact
tracing within a closed, and generally compliant population, namely the participants at a
scientific conference on epidemic modelling. One approach was based on reported contacts,
as recorded in a log book, the other based on the use of unobtrusive wearable proximity
sensors. While both methods were highly tolerated, it was found that neither on its own
was able to give a full picture of meaningful contacts that might have caused an infection
to spread. It is clear that other methods are needed to control the spread of the virus in
addition to contact tracing.
The question addressed in this paper is more modest. We imagine a risk assessment is
to be made within a specific workplace on whether and how the workplace can be made
‘safe’ to reopen following lockdown. Here we use the term safe to refer to the public health
of the whole of society, to avoid the workplace contributing to a resurgence of the virus
in the general population. Nevertheless, the employees, who are the agents in our model,
also benefit from safety, but it is assumed that the individual mortality and morbidity rates
are sufficiently low that the payoff to the individual is small. In addition, the stakeholders
benefiting from the output of workplace, would want the workplace to be productive. Such
stakeholders include general actors who benefit from the upturn in economy, the owners or
shareholders of the business in question, and the workers themselves in terms of security of
employment.
Thus, it might seem that safety and productivity are potentially conflicting aims. Given
a small overall rate of viral infection, an employer might seek to maximise the workplace
productivity by staying open, without isolation of exposed workers. But such actions would
clearly compromise safety, thus providing as a disbenefit to society. This might be couched
in terms of the classical prisoner’s dilemma problem within game theory. That is, if every
workplace took this attitude, then clearly resurgence within the general population would
be probable, whereas one or two isolated ‘bad apple’ employers might be able to benefit by
maximising their personal productivity, provided that others don’t.
In fact this ‘bad apple’ principle has been analysed in the context of epidemics by Enright
and Kao [9], who ran an agent based simulation where there are precisely such conflicting
payoffs. The specific motivation for their study was disease among farm animals where the
disbenefit to the farmer of complying with safety might be particularly harsh, such as the
slaughter of her entire herd. They found that a sharp phase transition occurs from sub-critical
R values to super-critical, for a relatively small amount of compliance. Their findings are
echoed by those of Eksin et al [8] in a stochastic network simulation of epidemics. The latter
also conclude that ‘a little empathy goes a long way’, meaning that a focus on treating and
isolating those infected can be more advantageous than an approach that seeks to protect the
healthy. See also the recent review [4] on the state of the art for game-theoretic approaches
to analysing agent behaviour within epidemics.
The present study was motivated by discussions at the end of April 2020 during a virtual
study group workshop on Mathematical Principles for Unlocking the Workplace at the end
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of April 2020, organised by the VKEMS1 initiative between the Isaac Newton Institute
(Campbridge), the International Centre for Mathematical Sciences (Edinburgh) and the UK’s
Knowledge Transfer Network. The participants were split into four teams to discuss different
natures of the person-to-person interactions that happen in different working environments;
brief verses lengthy, and with a closed set of colleagues versus with an open set of clients. This
study arose from the group look at working environments where interactions were lengthy
but with a closed set of colleagues.
The kind of workplaces we have in mind then, are those where workers have a relatively
static interaction network with other colleagues. Any interactions with other employees or
clients can be assumed to socially distanced. An example of such a working environment
might be a back office, which is split into teams that are physically co-located with a number
of middle managers and service personnel who naturally migrate between several teams.
Another example might be a factory where individual job functions are well demarcated and
a typical worker would only need to interact with a relatively small subset of other workers as
part of their normal duties. Thus we shall make the simplifying assumption, in what follows,
that the workplace can be represented by a fixed interaction network, with each worker as
a node, connected by links that represent workers who by the nature of their job function
cannot effectively socially distance from each other.
A recently published study [6] performs agent-based simulations of the spread of the
COVID-19 epidemic within a closed ‘facility’ rather than an open population. We note
though that that work does not address the specific question addressed here, namely the
effect of having some proportion of the population self-isolate, that is remove themselves
from the facility, in the case that they have been in contact with someone who develops
symptoms. Also, we don’t consider a completely closed facility, each of our workers are
assumed to go about their daily business outside of the workplace with some base level of
infection rate each day.
In the present work, we imagine a world in which rapid testing, with near instantaneous
results and routine contact tracing, is readily available for the whole population. We suppose
that there is nonetheless a risk of infection outside of the workplace. We wish to explore the
question of the effect within our chosen workplace of measures designed to stop any incoming
infection spreading to the entire workforce. In particular, we shall look at the effect of the
presence of a proportion of opaque workers, who are not transparent about their infection-
risk status, and do not go home when made aware that one of their colleagues has the virus.
Is there an incentive for the employers and employees alike to engage fully in transparency?
That is, is it valuable to engage with test, trace and isolate procedures in order to halt virus
spread while also maximising productivity?
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. The subsequent section introduces our
mathematical model, its underlying assumptions and the various parameters that may be
tuned to simulate different scenarios. Section 3 contains simulation results under the two
scenarios where the underlying rate of infection in the general population is either negligible
or significant. We also conduct some approximate mathematical analysis to help explain
the results. Section 4 contains discussion of the findings both from a scientific perspective
and from the point of view of public policy interventions and workplace psychology. Finally,
1www.vkemsuk.org
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section 5 makes recommendations.
2 The mathematical model
We have developed a simple discrete-time simulation model posed on a graph representation
of an office environment. An outline of the model is given in Fig. 1.
2.1 Underlying assumptions
The basic disease model we choose is a form of SEIR model. That is, the usual extension
to the Kermack-McKendrick model that allows for four states; (S)usceptable, (E)xposed
(infected but not yet infectious), (I)nfectious and (R)ecovered (with immunity from re-
infection). In line with what is known about COVID-19, in fact we choose a modified
variant in which there are two infectious states; A for (A)symptomatic infectious individuals
and U for infectious symptomatic, or (U)nwell. We suppose that susceptible individuals
can become exposed in one of two ways, either through a (small) probability of exposure
to the virus present in the general population, or with a much larger probability if one or
more of their connected co-workers is infectious. For simplicity, we shall suppose that the
rate of exposure outside of the workspace is constant, irrespective of each worker’s personal
circumstances. For the purposes of the simulation, it will also be useful to consider a sixth
disease state, (Q)uarantined, to represent those who are obliged to be in quarantine post
infection. Note that the Q state is only a small subset of those who are isolating at home
(see Fig. 1), which also includes other disease states.
Thus we can represent the disease dynamics as
S → E → A→ U → Q→ R,
with the possibility for remaining in each state for periods of time and the possibility of
skipping certain stages altogether (for example, A may transition straight to Q or to R
without going through U). The full set of possible transitions are illustrated by the arrows
in Fig. 1. The specific disease parameters and logical rules that determine the transitions
between these disease states are presented in Sec. 2.2.
For convenience, we choose a discrete-time version of the model, in which the fundamental
unit of time is the working day. To correct the model for the effect of weekends or other
regular workplace closure days, we could in principle exclude such days from our simulation
and choose α to be a given function of time, which would be larger after a closure day, and
adjust the time intervals tE,A,U,Q accordingly.
The fundamental model is a dynamic network with N nodes, in which nodes are workers
and the state at node i is a 3-tuple:
Xi = (xi, pi, oi);
xi ∈ {S,E,A, U,Q,R},
pi ∈ {0, 1},
oi ∈ {0, 1}.
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S E A U RAt work:
At home: S E A U Q
Never become symptomatic
Transparent behaviour
General behaviour
Opaque behaviour
Figure 1: Sketch outlining the operation of the discrete-event model. Here S is susceptible,
E is exposed (not yet infectious), A is asymptomatic infectious, U is unwell infectious, Q
is quarantined and R is recovered (and immune). Lines/arrows give all possible transitions
between states. See text for details.
Parameter Meaning Value
N number of workers 100
T period of simulation (days) 100
d mean number of workplace contacts 3–12
O percentage of nodes that are opaque 0–100
α probability of community infection {0, 0.001}
β probability of infection from an infectious connection 0.1
γ probability of becoming symptomatic 0.95
δ probability of gaining immunity after infection 0.5
 probability of non-transparent isolating due to contact 0.01
ζ probability of non-transparent isolating due to symptoms 0.01
tE incubation period before infectious 4
tA initial asymptomatic period while infectious 3
tU time following tA until disease free 7
tQ required time of quarantine after symptoms stop 5
µ1 productivity of home working {0, 0.7, 1}
µ2 productivity at work while sick {1, 0.2, 1}
Table 1: Parameter values used in the simulations. See text for interpretation and justifica-
tion.
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Hence, xi gives the disease state; pi is a binary variable that measures whether the worker is
present in the workplace (pi = 1) or is self-isolating at home (pi = 0); oi is a binary variable
that determines the opacity of the worker, namely whether they consistently engage in test,
trace and isolate and share their data openly (oi = 0), or not (oi = 1). The workplace
contact network of interactions is given by an adjacency matrix
A = {aij}; aij ∈ {0, 1},
such that i, j are in contact iff pipjaij = 1.
Note therefore that while we assume Aij is fixed in time, the actual workplace contact
network varies according to whether workers are at home or not. It is useful therefore to
define a current workplace contact matrix C and the set of workplace contacts Wi for each
node i:
C = {cij} = {pipjaij} and Wi = {j : Cij = 1}.
It is also helpful to define indicator functions fi and gi to determine respectively whether
one of node i’s contacts is infectious, or whether one is reporting symptoms:
fi =
{
1 if ∃j ∈ Wi such that xj ∈ {A,U},
0 otherwise,
gi =
{
1 if ∃j ∈ Wi such that oj = 0 and xj = U,
0 otherwise.
The opacity variable oi determines an individual worker’s behaviour if they become symp-
tomatic or if one of their contacts tests positive for the disease.
2.2 Time increment
The key to the model is the time update step, which determines how each worker transitions
between disease states. We first delineate all the update rules for transparent workers, before
explaining only what is different in the case of an opaque worker.
The behaviour of transparent workers: Assume oi = 0, and consider the transition
taking place in one time step to worker i.
1. Infection: If worker i is in work and susceptible, such that pi = 1 and xi = S, then the
probability of infection (transition to disease state E) in the next time step is α+ βfi.
Otherwise xi remains as S.
2. Isolation because of contact: In addition, if worker i is in work, and a transparent
work contact is unwell, such that pi = 1 and gi = 1, then pi → 0 in the next timestep.
That is, worker i goes home, irrespective of its own disease state xi in the present time
instant or the next.
3. Exposure: If worker i is exposed, such that xi = E, then xi remains in this state for
a total number of contiguous days equal to tE, before transitioning to disease state A,
as i becomes infectious but asymptomatic.
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Figure 2: Examples of randomly generated workplace contact networks, between workers
for six different random initial conditions of a network of N = 15 with having a 1/3 of the
workforce opaque (solid square) and 2/3 transparent (circle). One individual is assumed to
be infected with the virus and is in state E (the orange node labeled 0) whereas all others
are susceptible (green). (Top) realisations with d = 4; (bottom) d = 8.
4. Asymptomatic infectiousness: If i is asymptomatic, such that xi = A, then xi
remains in this state for a total number of contiguous days tA. After this, xi transitions,
in the next timestep and with probability γ, to U . Otherwise, xi remains in disease
state A for a further tU days, without ever passing to U . In other words, there is a
probability it is possible that worker i never feels unwell.
5. Symptomatic infectiousness If worker i is unwell, such that xi = U , then xi remains
in this state for a total of tU contiguous days, after which worker i passes to the recovery
step.
6. Isolation due to symptoms: In addition, if worker i is in work and unwell, such
that pi = 1 and xi = U , then pi → 0 for the current timestep. That is, as soon as
an individual becomes unwell, they do not come into work (provided that they are
transparent).
7. Recovery: After tA+tU time steps since the transition to disease state A, worker i be-
comes disease free. If pi = 0, then xi transitions to Q as i goes into a post-symptomatic
quarantine state, in which it remains for a total of tQ consecutive timesteps, after which
i goes to the immunity step. Else, that is if pi = 1, worker i passes to the immunity
step.
8. Immunity: At the end of the infection, with probability δ, the worker develops viral
antibodies so that xi → R and pi → 1. Else, with probability 1−δ, the worker does not
8
become immune, so that xi → S and pi → 1. If xi = R at any timestep, irrespective
of the value of pi, then worker i remains in R for the rest of the simulation, and pi
remains 1.
The behaviour of opaque workers. Workers who are not-transparent, oi = 1, are
assigned at the beginning of the simulation and remain that way for all time steps. Their
behaviour is identical to that of transparent workers except
2′. If pi = 1 and gi = 1, then pi → 0 in the next timestep, with probability . Otherwise
pi remains 1. That is, even if present opaque workers have unwell contacts, they might
stay in work.
6′. If pi = 1 and xi = U , and xi = A in the previous timestep, then pi → 0 for the
current timestep with probability ζ. Otherwise pi remains 1 for the entire time tU . So
when opaque workers become unwell, they may not go home and thus their contacts
are unaware that they may be infected and also do not go home.
3 Simulation results
All simulations were carried out in python using the parameter values given in Table 1.
These values are not supposed to accurately fit to a particular outbreak, but are broadly
inspired by COVID-19, so that the length of an infection, following incubation is tA+tU = 10
working days. Note that, due to reported low death rates among otherwise healthy working
age populations, we have simplified by assuming that all workers are eventually sufficiently
healthy to return to work at the end of the infection; this may be assumed to be a “best case
scenario”. We have further simplified by assuming that incubation and infection times tE,A,U
are deterministic, whereas a more representative simulation would allow these parameters to
be chosen from a distribution. We have also supposed that no individual is vaccinated.
At the time of writing, it is not clear what proportion of individuals obtain immunity
having had the disease, so we make the reasonable assumption that δ = 50% of infectious
individuals develop immunity, which lasts for the rest of the simulation run time. The
incubation period before infectiousness, the degree to which individuals are infectious before
they develop symptoms, and the proportion of individuals that are infectious but never
develop symptoms have also not been clearly established. Thus the relevant parameter
choices tE = 4, tA = 3 and γ = 0.95 are intended to be illustrative of what might be the
case. Note that the benefit of transparency is particularly sensitive to the choice of γ, the
probability of developing symptoms. Although this value is at the lower end of the current
estimate of 4% − 41% of COVID-19 positive patients being asymptomatic [3], the chosen
values of γ can equally be interpreted within the model as there being a probability of 0.95
of an infectious patient being detected within three working days through a combined regime
of regularly testing and reporting of suspicious symptoms.
Nevertheless, the parameter values can readily be altered as more information becomes
available for COVID-19, or indeed to model any other national-scale epidemic.
We have chosen a workplace with N = 100 employees. In each run, the topology of this
workplace is generated as a random (Erdo¨s-Renyi) symmetric graph with probability d/N
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Figure 3: Examples of cold runs for different size of contact network d and degree of opacity
O against time. In each plot, the red curve gives the proportion of unwell individuals (in
state U) and the blue curve gives the proportion who are at home (with pi = 0). Parameter
values are: (top left) d = 4, O = 0; (top middle) d = 4, O = 50%; (top right) d = 4,
O = 100%; (bottom left) d = 10, O = 0; (bottom middle) d = 10, O = 50%; (bottom right)
d = 10, O = 100%.
that each edge Aij = 1, independent of other edges. By definition we choose Aii = 0, hence
the average degree of each graph is actually
(N − 1) d
N
= 0.99d.
For a given opacity, O, we use the same process of ensuring that node i has probability O
that oi = 1 independently of the value oj for any other node j. Figure 2 illustrates examples
of graphs that are generated in this manner.
When analysing the results of simulations, it is useful to have a measure of productivity
Productivity =
1
NT
∑
0<t<T
[
1{xi 6=U,pi=1}(xi) + µ11{xi=U,pi=1}(xi) + µ21{xi 6=U,pi=0}(xi)
]
(1)
and lost productivity
Productivity Deficit = 1− Productivity. (2)
The rationale behind the parameters µ1 and µ2 is that those in work are assumed to
be fully productive if not sick and have fractional productivity µ1 if sick, whereas those
isolating at home do no work if they are sick and have fractional productivity µ2 if not. In
what follows, we shall take two extreme and one balanced measure of productivity.
“academic”: µ1 = 0, µ2 = 1; “factory”: µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0; “office”: µ1 = 0.2, µ2 = 0.7. (3)
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Figure 4: (Left) Proportion of workforce that become unwell at least once (red lines) or go
home (blue lines) as a function of the average contact network size d. Results are shown
for three different opacities O = 0% (dashed lines), O = 50% (dot-dashed) and O = 100%
(solid). (Right) Mean, plus and minus one standard deviation of the becoming ill proportions.
When running simulations, we shall consider two cases, which we refer to as running cold
and running hot depending on whether the overall rates of infection in society are negligible
or not.
“running cold”: α = 0; “running hot”: α = 0.001. (4)
3.1 Running cold
In a cold run, the chance of an infection from the outside world is negligible, so that the
parameter α = 0.
We start simulations at time zero with one exposed individual and all other individuals
in state S (we assume that the state of the disease in the general population is that there is
a negligible number of individuals who are already immune). Examples of such simulations
are shown in Fig. 3.
Note from the simulations the benefit of transparency. The left hand-plots show how
an infection that starts with one individual at day 0 quickly dies out. Whereas if 50% or
100% of the workers are opaque (middle and right panels) the consequence of that initial
infection is still present in the workplace after 100 days. Note how the size of the contact
network (difference between d = 4 in upper panels and d = 10 in lower panels) makes
little qualitative difference. However there is a massive quantitative difference when not all
workers are transparent. Given 50% opacity, the maximum size of the outbreak is such that
with d = 10 there are about 25 people who are sick at around day 30, rising to almost 40
people with 100% opacity.
In addition to single runs, it is useful to generate a statistical ensemble. We have done
this for a range of d and O values, taking 50 repeats for each parameter value. The results
are shown in Figs. 4 and 5, which show the proportion of workers that become unwell (enter
state U) and the proportion that go home (have pi = 1) at least once during the 100 day
simulation time.
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Figure 5: Similar to Fig. 4 but showing variation with opacity for three different values of
average degree; d = 4 (dashed lines), d = 7 (dot-dashed) and d = 10 (solid).
Observing the results against d (Fig. 5), we note how, for the 100% opacity case with
degree 10, almost all of the workforce appear to catch the disease. Thus a certain amount of
herd immunity is established in the population (recall the immunity rate δ = 0.5) and this is
what causes the infection rate to decrease towards the end of the simulation. The results for
50% opacity are similar. Smaller contact network sizes however result in smaller infections.
Further conclusions can be drawn from the graphs plotted against opacity in Fig. 5. Here
note that, for the case of the highest degree, there is a sharp increase in the proportion of
infected individuals for low opacity. For an intermediate degree, the proportion of infected
individuals appears to vary more linearly with opacity, with the sharp increase, if there is
one, occurring later, perhaps around 20% (although notice the large standard deviation).
For the lowest degree value, the number of infected individuals appears to be low, with the
sharpest increase at around 45%.
From these simulations, we can also compute the productivity deficit according to (1) and
(2). The results are presented in Fig. 6. The results for the “academic” working environment
(green lines) are as expected. In this environment, well individuals are equally productive
at home as in the workplace. So productivity is greatly enhanced by high transparency. In
the case of factories and mixed offices, especially the factory, the productivity curve is more
U-shaped and it may seem that optimal productivity can be gained at 100% opacity. But
at what price? In this scenario, for the higher degrees, the majority of the workforce have
caught the virus, and it seems clear that in reality the factory will need to be closed down,
because it has become a hotbed of infection.
3.2 Running hot
We have performed exactly the same set of simulations (with fresh randomisations, of course)
in the case of running hot (cf. (4)). Here the same initial condition is used as for the cold
case, with one randomly chosen exposed individual (state E) at t = 0 with all others in state
S. The difference now is that, with N = 100 and α = 0.001, approximately every 10 days a
new infected individual is likely to enter the workplace. Data that are exactly analogous to
12
Figure 6: (Top left): Productivity deficit as a function of degree (top figures) and opacity
(bottom figures) for the three different types of working environment — academic (green
lines), office (orange) and factory (red) — and three different opacities — 0% (dashed lines),
50% (dot-dashed) and 100% (solid). (Top Right): Mean, plus and minus one standard
deviation for the office scenario. (Lower panels): Same as above, but against opacity for
d = 4 (dashed lines), d = 7 (dot-dashed) and d = 10 (solid).
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Figure 7: Same as Fig. 3 but in the case of hot runs.
those in the cold case are presented in Figs. 7–10.
It is worth commenting on the different time-course dynamics in Fig. 7 than Fig.3. In the
case of a completely transparent workforce (left hand panels) note how the infection does
not die out for the case of running hot. This is because approximately every 10 days a new
infection enters the workplace. Thus the number of sick individuals (about 3 for d = 4 and
about 7 for d = 10) remains constant as does the number of workers at home (about 8 and
20 respectively) throughout the simulation. Note that the number who are sick at any one
time is roughly d times the number who would be expected to be sick if there was no contact
within the workplace. For either 50% or 100% opacity, in the case of low degree (upper
middle and right panels), the running hot case causes the infection to last much longer in
the workplace, with a much wider peak than the running cold case. The maximum number
of infected individuals also rises, compared to the cold runs, which is even more apparent in
the case of of 100% opacity.
These observations, based on just isolated simulation runs, are born out in general, in the
Monte Carlo parametric runs in Figs. 8–10 which, apart from the value of α, are run under
exactly the same assumptions as Figs 3–4 in the cold case. The results here are broadly
similar to the cold case, but note the dire consequences of large opacity in terms of the
spread of the disease.
3.3 Analysis
A simple analysis can estimate the reproduction number r0 in the case of different opacities
and average network degree, along with the size of the infection within the workplace as a
function of parameters by passing to a continuum limit. Taking the limit of a sufficiently
long time and sufficient network size T,N  1, and assuming that  = ζ = 0 for simplicity,
14
Figure 8: Similar to Fig. 4 but for running hot.
Figure 9: Similar to Fig. 5 but for running hot.
15
Figure 10: Same as Fig. 6 but for running hot
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we obtain the SIR-like model
S˙ =
(1− δ)
τ
I − ω d
N
βSI − αS, (5)
I˙ = αS + ω
d
N
βSI − 1
τ
I, (6)
R˙ =
δ
τ
I, (7)
where S, I and R now represent the numbers of the total workforce in states S, {I, U} and
R respectively as a function of time (dot represents differentiation with respect to time).
Here
τ = tA + tU and ω = O/100%
represent the time of infection and proportion of opaque individuals respectively, δ is the
proportion of people who gain immunity upon recovery and d/N represents the chance
that two individuals are connected within the workplace (the average degree of the network
divided by the total number of individuals). Note that total population is conserved, that
is S + I +R = N is constant.
We first nondimensionalise the model (5)–(7), scaling populations with the total popula-
tion N and time with the recovery timescale τ such that
(S, I, R) = N(S∗, I∗, R∗), t = t∗/τ, (8)
to find
S˙∗ = (1− δ)I∗ − r0S∗I∗ − aS∗, (9)
I˙∗ = aS∗ + r0S∗I∗ − I∗, (10)
R˙∗ = δI∗, (11)
where
r0 = ωdβτ and a = ατ. (12)
Note that r0 is the the basic reproduction number of the outbreak, representing the
average number of new infections one infected person generates within the workplace. The
parameter a = ατ is the balance of timescales between new infections entering the workplace
and infected individuals recovering (recall a = 0 is the “running cold” scenario such that
no new infections are entering the workplace). Along with the immunity rate δ, which is
already dimensionless, these three parameter groupings control the behaviour of the infection
within the workplace and will determine the dynamics of the disease. Total population is
still conserved, now scaled such that S∗ + I∗ +R∗ = 1.
The immediate benefit of non-dimensionalisation is that the relative importance of the
parameters of the simulation becomes obvious. For example r0 depends on the product of
d and ω, which implies the opacity that a workplace can tolerate before r0 > 1 is inversely
proportional to d the average number of interactions per worker. This duality between O
and d is also apparent in the simulation results (cf. the red curves in Fig. 4 with 5, and
Fig. 8 with 9).
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Figure 11: (Left) Plot of I∗0 given by (14) against r0 for different a ≥ 0 in the case of no
immunity (δ = 0). (Right) Positive value of R∞ obtained by solving (15) for different values
of δ > 0 in the running cold case (a = 0).
Moreover, steady states of the system (9)–(11) indicate what we expect to happen for
long times. This varies depending on the values of parameters r0, a and δ.
When a > 0 is non-zero (the running hot scenario) with some level of immunity δ 6= 0,
the steady state is S∗0 = I
∗
0 = 0, R
∗
0 = 1, that is everyone eventually catches and recovers
from the disease. When recovery confers no immunity (δ = 0), we find the steady state
S∗0 = 1− I∗0
=
r0 + 1 + a−
√
(r0 − 1− a)2 + 4ar0
2r0
, (13)
I∗0 =
r0 − 1− a+
√
(r0 − 1− a)2 + 4ar0
2r0
. (14)
In this case the infection is always present within the workforce with a level dependent
on both the infection dynamics on the network (r0) and the rate of infection outside the
workplace a. (Note that this collapses to I∗0 = 1 − 1/r0 when a = 0 as would be expected,
showing that the infection will die out if r0 < 1). Graphs of I
∗
0 versus r0 are shown in the
left-hand panel of Fig. 11.
For the running cold scenario, such that a = 0, with some level of immunity δ > 0, the
nontrivial steady state is given by
S∗0 = 1−R∞, I∗0 = 0, R∗0 = R∞,
where R∞ satisfies the transcendental equation
r0(R
∞ − 1)− δ + 1 = (1− r0 − δ) e−r0R∞/δ. (15)
Note that R∞ = 0 is always a solution to (15) for all r0, δ > 0, but there are also non-trivial
solutions, which we plot in Fig. 11 as a function of r0, for various 0 < δ < 1. There is a
(transcritical) bifurcation at r0 = 1 such that for r0 < 1 the non-zero steady-state value
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of R∗0 is R
∗
0 = 0, implying that the infection dies out. For r0 > 1, the non-trivial value of
R∞ > 0 becomes the stable steady state. Note how the R∞ curve rises steeply with r0, thus
explaining the shape of infection curves in Figs. 4 and 5.
4 Discussion
4.1 Observations from the simulations
Although we have only run the simulations for a fixed set of parameters, the analytical results
suggest a certain universality to our findings. In particular there is an inverse proportionality
between opacity and average contact degree (since r0 = ωdβτ); the greater the average
connectivity within the office, the smaller the opacity must be to avoid the infection taking
hold and eventually reaching the equilibrium.
In order to maximise productivity, Figures 6 and 10 also show that, in most types of
workplace, it is advantageous to have almost complete transparency. This is despite the fact
that this involves sending every contact home as soon as it is known that they are infected.
The exception is the case that we have called a “factory”, which is the extreme case where
there is no work done from home and productivity is simply the same as attendance. Here,
of course, it is best to send no one home, so that optimal productivity is obtained at an
opacity of 100%. However, we have shown that this case leads to the fastest possible spread
of infection and the largest infected population within the workplace. In reality, if contact
tracing is being conducted throughout the general population, such a scenario is likely to
lead to the workplace being identified as a hotbed of infection, leading to the “factory” being
forced to shut down, negative publicity for the employer and possible prosecution. Given the
characteristic ‘n’-shaped nature of the productivity deficit versus opacity curve, especially in
the case of running cold (Fig. 6), taking such catastrophic loss of productivity into account,
it would seem then that an optimal strategy to maximise productivity, would be again to
try to maximise transparency within the workforce.
It might be useful to reflect on what the variable “opacity” really represents. The opacity
of the workforce could be construed as the availability of regular testing to that workforce.
We have said that transparent workers go home when they enter state U , that is they first
develop symptoms. Instead, we could alternatively consider the state U to be the return
of a positive test. Then tA represents the length of time between catching the virus and
testing positive. In such a scenario, rather than thinking of workers as having either helpful
or unhelpful behaviours, we can consider transparency as degree to which a rapid, accurate,
regular testing regime is undertaken in the workplace.
4.2 Policy implications and incentives
These results suggest that making a workplace safe to reopen in the post peak phase of a
pandemic such as COVID-19 requires the adoption of a number of changes to the running of
the workplace and new behaviours on the part of both employers and employees. Employees
will have to, for example, declare to their employers when they have developed symptoms
of the virus or tested positive, to identify those in the workplace with whom they have been
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in contact and to quarantine at home for 14 days. Employers will have to facilitate these
communications and put in place arrangements to back-fill posts left empty through sickness
absence and quarantine. In a running cold scenario, where infection in the general population
is sparse, there could additionally be a requirement for employees to report when they have
been exposed to the virus outside of the workplace; to keep the workplace safe, workplace
contacts of this employee could also be required to quarantine
There are well-defined and evidence-based behavioural science principles that can be used
to inform how to support and encourage required changes in behaviour. These have been
summarised as they apply to reducing infections during the pandemic in a number of recent
reviews and commentaries [2, 5, 27] and have obvious application to plans to make return
to work safe. They suggest that to be effective, a workplace campaign would need to:
1. create a collective viewpoint emphasising how people can look after each other, rather
than how individuals can look after themselves;
2. messages and requests for changes to behaviour need to be from trustworthy and
credible sources delivered in relatable terms. Actions required need to be achievable;
3. create worry but not fear amongst employees. A degree of worry is required to motivate
uptake of protective behaviours, but worry to the point of fear can be paralysing,
leading to denial and avoidance behaviours. Messages creating worry have to be paired
with appropriate, achievable actions that employees can take, which will reduce the
anxiety and so reinforce the behaviour;
4. ensure that whatever employers and employees are being asked to do, they have the
capability, opportunity and motivation. All three are required for behaviour to occur.
For example, people need the knowledge (capability) of how to wash their hands ef-
fectively, convenient facilities in which to wash their hands (opportunity), and belief
that it is important for their safety and the safety of others that they wash their hands
(motivation). Only then will they reliably and effectively wash their hands (behaviour).
To achieve the required behaviours, it also needs to be specified and it has to be demon-
strated how behaving in this way will produce the desired outcome, but also avoid unin-
tended negative consequences. This might include, for example, unintentionally increasing
employees social-isolation. This requires spending time understanding the implications of
the behaviours employers and employees are being asked to perform. This can only be done
through investing in conversations and consultations. Messages and instructions need also
to be made really clear and direct. Anxious people do not process complex information so
well.
All of the above should together create a clear, engaging rationale and set of actions
and new social norms for the workplace. For some workers, including those on zero hours
contracts, compliance with new workplace requirements may involve loss of earnings and
discourage them from being transparent with their employers. Equally, employers may be
anxious about loss of productivity and profits, making it difficult for them to comply. This
suggests that in both cases compliance needs to be incentivised. The effectiveness of financial
incentives in encouraging changes in behaviour appears to depend on their framing and on
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exactly which behaviour is being encouraged. It is well-established that incentives offered
to compensate for potential losses may be particularly effective as motivators, implying that
the potential to lose anticipated earnings may be more likely to motivate behaviour than the
possibility of a financial windfall [25]. This suggests that compensating for loss of income for
both employer and employee would be important components of arrangements for safe return
to work. The independent SAGE committee report [19] on how best to support effective
application of testing for the virus and contact tracing recommends: ‘Support for isolation
should be provided: financial support to compensate lost income support for obtaining gro-
ceries etc; accommodation for those who cannot isolate in current residence; follow up to
check symptoms and wellbeing’ This is not to deny the influence of non-pecuniary motives
on people’s behaviour. Concerns about social disapproval and fairness are likely to interact
with, and have reinforcing effects on, compliance with requirements for transparency and
quarantining [10].
Compliance is also more likely if employers and employees feel a sense of ownership and
control over the way that the workplace return to work scheme is designed and run. For
employers and employees to co-design schemes would give all involved a sense of control over
the plans and processes. A perception that one has control over aspects of the workplace and
job role have long been linked to increased sense of well-being, lower perceived stress and
better general health (see for example [24]). Building a sense of ownership over the plans for
return to work are also likely to increase compliance and reduce unintended consequences
including exacerbating inequalities. Discussions which help employers understand the impact
of transparency and quarantining on employees will allow them to modify the scheme to
lessen any negative impacts. In the same way that independent SAGE suggest that effective
partnership with the community is essential to successful implementation of testing and
contact tracing, so would a partnership between employer and employees be needed in any
workplace for infection rates to be minimised [19]. Experience during the 2014-15 Ebola
outbreak in Sierra Leone suggests that allowing communities some control over how they
respond to the health threat improved their sense of well-being and resulted in a reduced
number of deaths associated with the pandemic [17].
The ability to make choices about how processes are carried out may also increase com-
pliance. Qualitative evidence from studies of sexually transmitted infections suggest that
giving people choice over whether they notify contacts themselves versus having someone
else undertake this task increases cooperation with contact tracing [7, 12].
Engaging the whole workforce in planning safe return to work might also improve com-
pliance through engendering a sense of collective efficacy; in other terms, a community spirit
which will be necessary to persuade people to be transparent about their infection status
and quarantine themselves. Recent evidence review suggests that key to adherence to quar-
antine were clear understanding of the disease and quarantine procedures, social norms and
perceived benefits of quarantine, perceived risk of the disease and practical problems such as
maintaining supplies and financial consequences of being out of work [26]. In light of this,
Government advisory bodies have issued guidance to encourage quarantining that includes
emphasising civic duty, advertising the changing social norms and allowing others in the
community to express disapproval and stressing the value of the organisation, in this case,
the employing organisation.
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5 Conclusion and recommendations
It is helpful to make some recommendations for policy makers, both government and em-
ployers, as well as to the behaviour of employees in the kind of closed, fixed-interaction
workplaces envisaged in this study.
Organise workplaces into small, intersecting groups. We recommend that all work-
places should seek to minimise the average number of work contacts per worker. Other
studies have suggested work should take place in fixed “bubbles” that do not interact
with each other. For most operations, strict bubbles are not feasible. Instead, our
results show that the necessary degree of transparency (the rigour to which test, trace
and isolate is required) is directly proportional to the size of the average workplace
interaction network.
The no detriment principle. We recommend workplaces engender a culture where there
is no perceived detriment to a worker being transparent. One issue can be a workplace
where there are a lot of self-employed or ‘gig economy’ workers who only get paid
when they are present. Mechanisms need to be established so that all workers are fully
remunerated if they are required to self-isolated and penalised if they are found to be
at work while infectious. One such policy intervention could be the introduction of
governmental statutory sick pay for all workers irrespective of their contractual status,
from day one of self-isolation.
The benefit of mutualism. As in points 1-4 in the previous section, and the other evi-
dence there, we need to encourage workplace campaigns that are effective. A sense of
shared ownership in maintaining the workplace infection free would need to be incul-
cated through as sense of collective efficacy. This might involve an employee/employer
partnership that runs its own workplace test, trace and isolate system. This may be
more effective than a scheme administered by an outside authority where there is the
potential for lack of trust, for example over data privacy.
Financial and other disincentives for non-compliant workplaces. For some businesses,
there may be a temptation for the employer to seek short term profit over long term
benefit. If infection rates are low in the general population, there may be unscrupulous
or ignorant employers who try to keep everyone in work. We saw this in our models for
the “factory” scenario, in which theoretical maximal productivity could be achieved
with no transparency whatsoever. It should be the function of a Health & Safety In-
spectorate to provide large penalties to deter such behaviour which would clearly not
be in the public good.
Individual solutions for individual workspaces Many of the quantitative findings in
this study are a result of the generic parameter choices made in the simulation runs of
our mathematical model. Some of these are disease parameters, which for COVID-19
remain unclear at the time of writing. Others related to the nature of the work; for
example what exactly constitutes a link between two workers can greatly affect the
probability of infection between individuals. We recommend that individual employers
should be encouraged to run a playable version of the mathematical model we have
22
introduced in order to test the safety of their operation. This may also involve ethno-
graphic studies both to observe how interactions happen in reality and also to design
the optimal psychological and policy interventions to obtain the desired outcome.
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